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Chapter 6
Trading in 401(k) Plans during
the Financial Crisis
Ning Tang, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Stephen P. Utkus
Defined contribution (DC) or 401(k) plans are now the dominant form of
US retirement accounts. They cover over 65 million American employees
and encompass some $3 trillion in assets, with approximately two-thirds of
those assets invested in equities.1 During the financial crisis of 2008–9,
retirement plan participants were confronted with one of the most dra-
matic downturns in stock prices, and one of the sharpest increases in
market volatility, since the Great Depression. While only one-quarter of
participants chose to trade in their accounts over our analysis period, in
response to the crisis there was a sharp increase in the number of partici-
pants trading2 and the fraction of portfolios shifted away from equities rose
by nearly eight times. In this chapter, we trace how 401(k) plan participants
as investors behaved in this exceptional market environment and identify
whether and how trading patterns during the peak months of the financial
crisis differed from trading during less volatile times.
We consider three separate explanations for heightened portfolio trad-
ing activity during the crisis. First, we evaluate the motivation for trading—
whether 401(k) plan participants acted as momentum investors, simply
selling equities as markets fell, or whether they were reacting to increased
volatility of returns. Second, we consider the impact of prior trading
experience on behavior during the crisis, comparing first-time traders
during the crisis with those who were more experienced. Third, our analy-
sis examines whether the salience of information on retirement wealth—as
represented by the receipt of quarterly statements during certain months
of the crisis—has an independent effect on trading behavior.
Prior research in household finance has shown that employees in 401(k)
plans (DC plans) are often characterized by inertia, rarely altering their
investment portfolios during normal market cycles. Only a minority trades
at all and very active traders realize reduced returns.3 There have also been
studies indicating that holders of low-cost brokerage accounts are more
active traders; here too, very active traders realize lower net returns.4 Both
sets of studies suggest the dominance of behavioral factors in driving
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household investment patterns: inertia broadly, with overconfidence
among a small group of active traders. Yet the literature to date focuses
on relatively calm financial markets. Our goal in this chapter is to examine
401(k) participant behavior from January 2006 to March 2009, to explore
how retirement plan investors behaved when confronted with an extraor-
dinary financial crisis.
Drawing on a large sample of 401(k) plans administered by Vanguard, we
show that only a minority of 401(k) investors traded in their accounts,
either before or during the crisis. Nevertheless, behavior did change for
those who traded: the proportion of participants trading each month rose
by nearly one-quarter, from 2.4 to 2.9 percent, and the mean portfolio
fraction shifted away from equities rose almost eightfold during the crisis.
We also show that this equity-selling pattern was in part due to increased
sensitivity to volatility during the crisis. For instance, precrisis, a two stan-
dard deviation rise in market volatility (uncertainty) was associated with a
4 percent shift away from equities, while during the crisis it induced a
10 percent shift away. Responsiveness to returns also changed: 401(k)
traders shifted from a momentum strategy during the precrisis period to
a contrarian strategy during the turmoil. Thus, a sharp market decline
(measured by a two standard deviation drop in the prior month’s equity–
bond spread) was associated with a 5 percent momentum shift out of
equities precrisis, but during the crisis it elicited a 5 percent contrarian
shift toward equities. In effect, an anticipated increase in investor reaction
to volatility during the crisis period was partly offset by a contrarian ‘buy on
the dips’ reaction to returns.
We also discover that prior trading experience played a paradoxical role
in these dynamics: the most experienced active traders were less sensitive to
market volatility and least contrarian during the crisis. But the least experi-
enced trader group, first-time traders during the crisis, reacted much more
negatively to rising volatility; these individuals were also more contrarian in
their reactions to returns. Moreover, first-time traders were on average
younger, more likely to be female, lower paid, and less wealthy than the
experienced group, suggesting some degree of financial naivete´ or illiter-
acy. Their tendency to react strongly to volatility fits this characterization;
their tendency to act as contrarian investors during the crisis does not.
These results suggest that 401(k) trading is more nuanced than previously
imagined, and that 401(k) traders cannot be easily characterized as inex-
perienced, momentum investors. Finally, we find that making account
wealth more salient during the crisis period had a surprising ameliorating
effect. Prior to the crisis, participant trading patterns exhibited no measur-
able response when participants’ quarterly statements were received from
plan sponsors. In contrast, receiving such information during the turmoil
led traders to independently boost equity holdings by 2 percent.
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In what follows, we briefly review prior research on portfolio trading
behavior. Next, we describe our data, including a description of participant
trading patterns and characteristics. Our empirical strategy involves com-
parisons of trading patterns prior to and during the crisis, and we also
detail how trading patterns varied by prior trading experience. A final
section concludes.
Background
Prior research has offered competing views about why investors might trade
in their investment portfolios. Early economic models suggested that in-
vestors would maintain constant portfolio allocations over the life cycle
barring new information (cf. Aumann, 1976; Milgrom and Stokey, 1982).
Subsequently, some have proposed that trading will occur to take advan-
tage of tax strategies and reduce search costs, as well as for life cycle reasons
(cf. Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Bergstresser
and Poterba, 2002). The neoclassical life cycle mode has also been
extended to take into account labor income and consumption shocks
as drivers of portfolio trading (cf. Horneff et al., 2009; Chai et al., 2010).
From a less neoclassical vantage point, other researchers have proposed
‘behavioral’ explanations for trading, including the disposition effect,
where traders are unwilling to sell losers (cf. Shefrin and Statman, 1985);
overconfidence leading to excess turnover, and an inability to understand
trading costs (Odean, 1998, 1999; Barber and Odean, 2000, 2001); and
increasing trading volumes with high market volatility (cf. Epps and Epps,
1976; Cornell, 1981; Karpoff, 1987).
Relatively few empirical studies have examined trading in the context of
DC retirement accounts. An analysis of a single large 401(k) plan found
very limited trading, and what trading there was seemed to be momentum
or return-chasing (Agnew et al., 2003). Additionally, extreme negative
returns were seen as necessary to motivate plan participants to trade
(Agnew, 2004). Using a much larger set of DC plans and participants,
and analyzing a period of relatively calm markets, Mitchell et al. (2006)
also found little evidence of portfolio churning in 401(k) accounts. Parti-
cipants who did trade during those relatively calm markets were older,
better-paid, and wealthier men. Moreover, as in studies on brokerage
account traders, the active 401(k) traders also earned lower returns.5
One issue not yet examined in detail is how US investors responded to
the market shock of 2008–9, whether in retirement or personal investment
accounts. In what follows, we explore whether and how 401(k) participant
trading responded, and what these patterns tell us about theories of inves-
tor behavior.
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An overview of trading patterns in DC
pension accounts
We assess 401(k) trading activity over the period January 2006–March 2009.
In this time frame, US and global stock prices at first rose through October
2007; thereafter, they began to fall as the mortgage finance crisis acceler-
ated and macroeconomic conditions deteriorated. Returns on US stocks
relative to US taxable bonds, measured by the spread between the monthly
return on the S&P 500 Index and the Barclay’s US Aggregate Bond Index,
widened and became increasingly negative. Market volatility rose early in
2008 as the US mortgage financing crisis deepened, and in September
2008, investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed and insurer AIG was
rescued by the federal government. These events marked the beginning of
an accelerated decline in stock prices and an extraordinary increase in
stock price volatility, with stocks underperforming bonds in the worst
months by 14 percent (October 2008), 10 percent (November 2008),
and 10 percent (February 2009).
To examine the impact of this market shock on 401(k) trading patterns,
we draw on administrative records for active 401(k) participants in nearly
1,900 DC plans observed over the thirty-nine-month period.6 On average,
65,000 of the 2.25 million 401(k) participants observed traded or moved
money between investment options in their plans.7 The dataset provides
extensive information on individual plan participants, including their age,
sex, account balances, plan tenure, indicators of nonretirement-plan
wealth and homeownership, and whether the participants were registered
for web account access.8 We also observe each person’s trade date, as well as
the amount, source, and destination of funds traded, summarized on a
monthly basis. The trading dataset is augmented with information on
monthly returns of all investment options in each plan.
Our goal is to compare observed trading patterns precrisis, or January
2006–August 2008, with trading activity during the crisis, defined as Septem-
ber 2008–March 2009. We select the latter to define the crisis period due
to the extreme return and volatility characteristics of US stocks over that
seven-month span.9 Comparing these two periods, Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1
show that the fraction of participants trading in a given month rose from
2.4 to 2.9 percent, an increase of 23 percent, and the mean number of
participants trading jumped nearly one third, from just over 61,000 precri-
sis to more than 81,000 during the crisis.10 As a measure of trading inten-
tions, we calculate each trader’s net flow to equities, defined as the
participant’s monthly flow to equities less his monthly flow to fixed income
assets, as a fraction of his prior month-end account balance.11,12 Prior to
the crisis, during which time stocks underperformed bonds by 0.1 percent
per month on average, the average trader shifted 1.2 percent of his balance
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/8/2012, SPi
104 Reshaping Retirement Security
away from equities in a typical month; during the crisis, when stocks under-
performed by 6.5 percent per month, the average trader shifted 11.1
percent of his balance away from equities. Equity market volatility, defined
as the standard deviation of daily stock index changes in a given month,
also rose, from under 1 percent precrisis to 3.6 percent during the crisis.
Types of traders
Trader characteristics are summarized in Table 6.2, Panel A, for the entire
period (Column 1), as well as separately in the precrisis (Column 2) and
crisis periods (Column 3). As we have found before, 401(k) plans traders
tend to be male, affluent, and relatively long tenured;13 the average trader
was a 46-year-old man with an account balance of nearly $115,000 and plan
tenure of over ten years. During the crisis, however, trader characteristics
changed somewhat: they became more female, with shorter tenure and
lower account balances (by about 12 percent), and with less nonretirement
wealth. Inasmuch as these individuals are also those having lower levels of
financial literacy (cf. Lusardi et al., 2010), it suggests that the financial
meltdown prompted less financially sophisticated/knowledgeable indivi-
duals to trade.
Table 6.1 Incidence of 401(k) trading
Entire period
(1/06–3/09)
Precrisis
(1/06–8/08)
Crisis
(9/08–3/09)
Change (crisis–
precrisis) (%)
No. of traders
(thousands)
64.80 61.25 81.11 32
No. of
participants
(millions)
2.25 2.23 2.38 7
Participants
trading (%)
2.5 2.4 2.9 23
Net flow to
equities (%)
3.5 1.2 11.1 789
Benchmarks
Equity–bond
spread (%)
1.69 0.17 6.89 3,921
Equity market
volatility (%)
1.53 0.93 3.59 286
Note : Derived from a panel of 1,886 401(k) plans observed January 2006–March 2009. Partici-
pants are currently employed and eligible to contribute to the plan in months observed.
Traders are participants who exchanged (traded) between one or more investment options
in their plans in a given month. Values are monthly averages over the periods indicated.
Source : Authors’ calculations (rows 1–4); and WRDS (https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/
wrds/).
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We are also interested in whether prior experience with trading influ-
enced trading patterns during the crisis. Figure 6.2 depicts the distribution
of number of trades over several time periods. We define active traders as
those who had traded at least three times precrisis; this group accounts for
31 percent of all traders precrisis. Infrequent traders were the remaining 69
percent of precrisis traders, and they traded only one to two times precrisis.
We also identify first-time crisis traders as those first observed trading during
the crisis period.14 Panel B compares these three groups and shows that
active traders were wealthier (in terms of 401(k) account balance and
nonretirement wealth), more male, and longer tenured than other traders.
For example, the mean account balance of active traders, at around
$157,000, was more than $50,000 above average balances for infrequent
trader, and nearly $88,000 above first-time crisis trader balances. Infre-
quent traders tended to be less wealthy, more female, and less tenured
than active traders, and first-time crisis traders even more so. Again, these
characteristics are associated with lower levels of financial literacy.
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Figure 6.1 Proportion of 401(k) participants trading over time
Note: The vertical line indicates the onset of the crisis period.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Table 6.2 Demographic characteristics of traders as of September 2008
Panel A. All traders
(1) Entire
period
(2)
Precrisis
(3)
Crisis
(4) Diff: crisis–precrisis
(3-2)
Age (mean years) 46.2 46.5 46.6 0.1***
% Male 63 64 62 2***
Average account
balance ($)
$114,765 $123,849 $108,863 $14,986***
Plan tenure (years) 10.8 11.2 10.5 0.7***
% Rich 31 31 29 2***
% Poor 34 33 35 2***
% Homeowner 75 76 73 3***
% Web-registered 86 88 84 4***
N 683,399 569,488 320,520
Panel B. Traders by type
(5) Active
traders,
precrisis
(6)
Infrequent
traders,
precrisis
(7) First-
time crisis
traders
(8) Diff: active–
infrequent traders
(5)–(6)
(9) Diff:
active–first-
time crisis
traders (5)–(7)
Age (mean years) 47.7 46 45.1 2*** 3***
% Male 69 62 57 7*** 13***
Average account
balance ($)
$157,150 $106,968 $69,348 $50,183*** $87,802 ***
Plan tenure
(years)
12.4 10.5 8.6 1.9 *** 3.8***
% Rich 32 31 26 1*** 6***
% Poor 32 34 38 1*** 6***
% Homeowner 79 75 66 4*** 13***
% Web-registered 90 87 77 3*** 13***
N 191,572 377,916 113,911
Note : See Table 6.1 for period definitions. Participant characteristics measured as of Septem-
ber 2008. Active traders traded more than three times precrisis (31 percent) and infrequent
traders had one to two trades precrisis (69 percent). First-time crisis traders did not trade
precrisis but did trade for the first time during the crisis. Average monthly account balance
refers to the average balance in months where the trader had a balance. Wealth indicators are
as follows: ‘poor’ refers to nonretirement wealth <$7,280; ‘rich’ >$61,289; with the reference
category omitted. Panel A (Column 4) versus Panel B (Columns 8 and 9) differences indicated
via t-tests (*** indicates 1% significance level).
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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A comparison of portfolio and trading characteristics for the three trader
types is presented in Table 6.3. All three groups shifted money out of
equities during the crisis, with active traders shifting the least (5 percent)
and first-time traders the most (20 percent). All three had similar equity
exposure before the crisis (71–72 percent), but first-time traders moved to
the lowest equity position during the crisis (50 percent) versus other
traders (60–61 percent), due to their larger shift out of stocks. Active
traders had more complex portfolios in terms of number of funds, and
they traded more frequently per month; nevertheless, when they traded,
they moved a smaller fraction of their portfolios (22 percent) than did
infrequent traders (36 percent) or first-time crisis traders (46 percent).
Overall, active traders accounted for about two-thirds of trading volume
during the entire period, versus 31 percent for infrequent traders and 5
percent for first-time traders. During the crisis, first-time crisis traders
accounted for over one-quarter of all trading volume.15
Multivariate analysis of trading patterns
As noted above, the fraction of 401(k) traders’ portfolios shifted out of
equities rose by nearly a factor of eight during the crisis period. Several
possible explanations for this pattern come to mind. One is a ‘fear factor’
0%
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40%
50%
60%
70%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9+
Number of trades
Precrisis period Crisis period Entire period
Figure 6.2 Distribution of the number of trades: precrisis, crisis, and entire period
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Table 6.3 Portfolio and trading characteristics
Entire period
(1/06–3/09)
Precrisis
(1/06–8/08)
Crisis
(9/08–3/09)
Net flow to equities (%)
Active traders 2 1 5
Infrequent traders 5 3 12
First-time crisis
traders
20 NA 20
All traders 4 2 11
Portfolio in equities (%)
Active traders 69 72 60
Infrequent traders 69 71 61
First-time crisis
traders
66 71 50
All traders 69 71 61
Number of funds held
Active traders 5.8 5.8 5.6
Infrequent traders 4.6 4.6 4.7
First-time crisis
traders
4.1 4.1 4.0
All traders 5.3 5.4 4.9
Mean number of trades per month
Active traders 1.2 1.2 2.4
Infrequent traders 1.0 1.0 1.6
First-time crisis
traders
1.1 NA 1.1
All traders 1.1 1.1 1.8
Mean portfolio traded (%)
Active traders 22 22 20
Infrequent traders 36 36 34
First-time crisis
traders
46 NA 46
All traders 28 27 31
Dollar trading volume (%)
Active traders 64 68 49
Infrequent traders 31 32 25
First-time crisis
traders
5 NA 26
All traders 100 100 100
Note : See Tables 6.1 and 6.2 for variable definitions. Percent of portfolio trade is calculated as
the sum of total inflows and outflows divided by 2 and divided by the prior month’s balance.
Equities include equity funds and the equity portfolio of balances funds, estimated at 60
percent of balanced fund assets.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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hypothesis: that is, traders might have sold stocks due to concern over
rising market volatility.16 In other words, the crisis could have induced
some to think that markets were riskier than they had previously believed,
and so they responded by reducing equity exposure. From this perspective,
selling equities represented adaptive learning to new knowledge about
equity market ‘tail risk’. A second hypothesis is a ‘performance chasing’
or momentum hypothesis: 401(k) traders might buy equities in response to
rising markets but sell equities in falling markets. Because many 401(k)
participants are arguably unsophisticated investors, they might be hypothe-
sized to pursue a naive momentum strategy, rather than a ‘buy on the dips’
contrarian strategy.17 A third hypothesis is that investors’ trading patterns
may be influenced by the salience of financial information.18 In our data-
set, we know the month in which participants received their account state-
ments and so we use the delivery of paper statements as a measure of
refreshed information regarding one’s wealth.19 Holding all other factors
constant, receiving the quarterly statement might have reminded traders of
their losses and possibly elicited a separate trading response, independent
of market volatility and momentum effects.
We test these hypotheses using the following multivariate model, estim-
ated using OLS with controls for clustering at the plan and individual
levels:
NETFLOWPCTi;j ;t ¼ b0þb1TRADINGt þb2TRADINGt
CRISISt þb3DEMOi;tþb4PLANj ;t þ ei;j ;t
ð1Þ
Here, NET_FLOW_PCTi,j,t represents the ith participant’s fractional net
flow to equities in the jth plan in month t. TRADING is a vector of variables
testing our trading hypotheses. For the volatility test, we include the stan-
dard deviation of changes in the daily Standard & Poor’s price index for
the current month t. For the momentum/contrarian hypothesis, we
include the spread between equity and bond returns for the current
month, as well as two lagged months.20 For the report effect, we include a
control indicating whether the participant received his statement in month
t. CRISIS refers to a dummy time variable flagging the crisis period, Sep-
tember 2008–March 2009. DEMO includes a vector of participant demo-
graphic controls21 and PLAN factors represent the firm’s industrial
sector.22 All regressions also incorporate the key interaction term of inter-
est, TRADING  CRISIS, indicating the marginal effects of the controls
during the crisis versus the precrisis period.23
Coefficient estimates of equation (1) appear in Table 6.4. The ‘fear
factor’ hypothesis cannot be rejected, judging from increased trader sensi-
tivity to volatility during the crisis: a 1 percent increase in monthly price
volatility was associated with a 1.7 percent shift away from equities precrisis,
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but the effect more than doubled to 3.8 percent during the crisis period. In
standardized terms, a two standard deviation increase in month volatility
would mean a shift away from equities of 4.3 percent precrisis, but a 9.7
percent shift away from equities during the crisis.
Regarding the momentum hypothesis, trader responsiveness to recent
returns seemed to follow the momentum approach precrisis, but it moved
to a more contrarian strategy during the crisis months. Focusing on the
largest effect, a 1 percentage point rise in the prior month equity–bond
spread was associated with a shift precrisis toward equities of 0.5 percent
(Column 1), which is a momentum-based strategy; during the crisis (Col-
umn 3), the effect was contrarian, with a shift away from equities of 0.5
percent. As another example, consider a two standard deviation decline in
the prior month equity–bond spread: precrisis, it would have meant a 4.9
percent move away from stocks, and during the crisis period, a 4.8 percent
move into stocks for a ‘buy on the dips’ strategy.24
Table 6.4 Determinants of net flows to equities for 401(k) plan traders: precrisis
versus crisis periods
Mean s (1) Precrisis
(marginal)
(1/06–8/08)
(2) Crisis
(marginal)
(9/08–3/09)
(3) Total
crisis
effect
I. Market shock test
Equity market volatility
month t (%)
1.53 1.27 1.68*** 2.12*** 3.80***
II. Momentum/contrarian test
Equity–bond spread
month t (%)
1.69 5.28 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.01***
Equity–bond spread
month t - 1
1.80 4.60 0.53*** 1.06*** 0.53***
Equity–bond spread
month t - 2
1.25 4.34 0.37*** 0.16*** 0.21***
III. Information salience test
Report month (=1) 0.39 0.48 0.07* 2.24*** 2.16***
N 2,131,938
R2 0.05
Note : The dependent variable in this ordinary least squares regression is participant net flow to
equities (monthly mean value of3.18 percent); explanatory variables are as listed, as well as a
control for the crisis period. The model includes plan and participant-level controls: male
indicators, age home ownership, account balance, web access, year dummies, industry sector
indicator, and missing value indicator. Column 1 reports coefficients for the precrisis period;
Column 2 reports additional effects for the crisis period; and Column 3 provides total effects
for the crisis period.
*** indicates 1% significance level.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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Regarding the salience of information, it would appear that quarterly
statements had little impact on movements into or out of equities in the
precrisis period; however, during the crisis period, the receipt of quarterly
statements was associated with a separate 2 percent shift into equities. In
other words, the information had a net contrarian or stabilizing effect
during the crisis months when stock prices were falling, after controlling
for declining stock prices and increased volatility.
Differences by trader type
Next, we consider whether experienced traders behaved differently from
inexperienced ones, by incorporating TYPE, a variable indicating the in-
dividual’s prior experience trading in his account. As noted above, active
traders had three or more trades precrisis; infrequent traders had one to
two trades precrisis; and first-time crisis traders engaged in trading for the
first time during the crisis. We also include an interaction of TRADING 
CRISIS with TYPE to measure marginal effects of active and first-time crisis
traders:
NETFLOWPCTi;j ;t¼ b0 þ b1TRADINGt þ b2TRADINGt CRISIStþ b3TRADINGt CRISIStTYPEi
þ b4DEMOi;t þ b5PLANj ;t þ ei;j ;t
ð2Þ
Table 6.5 reports results, with marginal effects in Panel A and total effects
given in Panel B. Column 1 (in both panels) focuses on the precrisis period
and results are virtually identical to the precrisis effects reported previously.
During the crisis, active traders reacted to volatility similar to all traders
precrisis; for this group, a 1 percent rise in monthly market volatility during
the crisis was associated with a 1.69 percent portfolio shift away from
equities. But infrequent traders and first-time crisis traders reacted much
more strongly to changes in volatility during the crisis: the same 1 percent
increase in volatility prompted infrequent traders to shift 4.4 percent of
their portfolio out of equities (Panel B, Column 3), while first-time crisis
traders shifted 6.8 percent (Panel B, Column 4). Put differently, a two
standard deviation increase in volatility would be expected to induce active
traders to shift 4.3 percent of their portfolios out of equities, while infre-
quent investors and first-time crisis traders would move 11.2 and 17.3
percent, respectively. Hence, the market volatility or ‘fear factor’ response
seems more prevalent among the inexperienced.
In terms of the momentum test, there was a clear shift from momentum
to contrarian behavior during the crisis for all three trader types based on
the prior month’s equity–bond spread (Panel B of Table 6.5). But first-time
investors became even more contrarian than did infrequent investors, who
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Table 6.5 Determinants of net flows to equities for 401(k) plan traders by type of
trader: precrisis versus net flow to equities
Mean s (1) Precrisis
(1/06–8/08)
(2)
Crisis
(9/08–
3/09)
(3)
Crisis:
active
traders
(9/08–3/
09)
(4) Crisis:
first-time
traders
(9/08–3/
09)
Panel A. Marginal effects
I. Market shock test
Equity market
volatility
month t (%)
1.53 1.27 1.85*** 2.57*** 2.73*** 2.37***
II. Momentum/contrarian test
Equity–bond
spread month
t (%)
1.69 5.28 0.32*** 0.26*** 0.04* 0.08***
Equity–bond
spread month
t1
1.80 4.60 0.53*** 1.23*** 0.30*** 0.13***
Equity–bond
spread month
t2
1.25 4.34 0.36*** 0.08*** 0.00 0.10***
III. Information salience test
Report month
(=1)
0.39 0.48 0.11*** 4.11*** 1.21*** 1.15***
N 2,131,938
R 2 0.06
Panel B. Total effects
I. Market shock test
Equity market
volatility
month t (%)
1.53 1.27 1.85*** 1.69*** 4.42*** 6.80***
II. Momentum/contrarian test
Equity–bond
spread month
t (%)
1.69 5.28 0.32*** 0.09* 0.06*** 0.03***
Equity–bond
spread month
t1
1.80 4.60 0.53*** 0.40*** 0.70*** 0.84***
Equity–bond
spread month
t2
1.25 4.34 0.36*** 0.29 0.29*** 0.39***
III. Information salience test
Report month
(=1)
0.39 0.48 0.11*** 2.79*** 4.00*** 2.85***
Continued
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in turn were more contrarian than active investors. Thus, a two standard
deviation decline in the equity–bond spread during the crisis would have
been associated with a 7.7 percent movement among first-time crisis in-
vestors, 6.5 percent for infrequent investors, and 3.7 percent for active
traders. We also note that the information salience effect from quarterly
statements was positive for all three types of investors, but for reasons that
are not entirely clear, infrequent traders were the most responsive (with a 4
percent effect in Column 3, Panel B) versus active traders and first-time
crisis traders (2.79 and 2.85 percent, respectively).
Conclusion
The financial crisis of 2008–9 produced some of the largest drops in stock
returns and largest increases in market volatility ever experienced in the
United States since the Great Crash. Although most 401(k) plan partici-
pants did not trade in response to these events over the past few years, some
investment patterns did change. The number of participants trading rose,
and, most notably, the fraction of portfolios shifted out of stocks increased
by nearly a factor of eight, rising from 1.2 percent in the month prior to the
crisis to 11.1 percent during the crisis.
Overall, the 401(k) traders examined here exhibited a rather nuanced
set of behaviors during the crisis. As anticipated, there was a heightened
Table 6.5 Continued
Mean s (1) Precrisis
(1/06–8/08)
(2)
Crisis
(9/08–
3/09)
(3)
Crisis:
active
traders
(9/08–3/
09)
(4) Crisis:
first-time
traders
(9/08–3/
09)
N 2,131,938
R2 0.06
Note : See Table 6.4. The regression also includes interaction terms for the crisis, and for active
and first-time traders during the crisis (infrequent traders are the reference group). The
model includes plan and participant-level controls: male indicators, age, home ownership,
account balance, web access, year dummies, industry sector indicator, and missing value
indicator. Panel A, Column 1 reports coefficients for the precrisis period; Column 2: addi-
tional effects for the crisis period (also the additional effect for infrequent traders, the
reference group); Column 3: additional effects for active traders during the crisis; and Column
4: additional effect for first-time traders during the crisis. Panel B summarizes total effects for
the precrisis period and for the three types of traders in the crisis.
*** indicates 1% significance level.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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sensitivity to market volatility, which contributed to larger sales of equities.
We interpret this as an adaptive learning response, with some investors
becoming aware of the true ‘tail risk’ associated with equities and hence
reducing their holdings during the crisis. As might also be expected, this
heightened sensitivity was most acute among the least experienced trading
group, first-time crisis traders. These first-time traders have demographic
characteristics often associated with lower levels of financial literacy, and so
they might have been anticipated to respond more negatively to a sharp
increase in stock market volatility. Yet at the same time, 401(k) traders
became more contrarian in their response to falling markets during the
crisis. Therefore, the increased sensitivity to market volatility was offset, in
part, by a tendency to ‘buy on the dips’ in response to falling markets. What
is more, first-time crisis traders were more likely to be contrarian during the
crisis than active traders.
This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that 401(k) participants with
characteristics typically associated with less investment experience may
have overreacted to market volatility, while still in aggregate engaging in
a more sophisticated contrarian strategy than their active-trading counter-
parts. We also found surprising the fact that those who received their
quarterly account statements during the crisis tended to move into, rather
than out of, equities during the crisis. Perhaps the provision of account
information had an independent stabilizing, rather than destabilizing,
effect during the financial crisis.
Overall, these patterns belie a simplistic view that 401(k) participants are,
in aggregate, naı¨ve investors who pursue momentum or return-chasing in
falling markets, selling equities even to the point of liquidating their entire
equity positions. It is true that the less experienced plan traders, those who
may have been less financially sophisticated, did react more strongly to
abnormally high stock market volatility than did experienced traders. Yet
their contrarian ‘buy on the dips’ countervailing response to returns in-
dicates more complex dynamics than might have been expected.
Many 401(k) plans today impose trading restrictions designed to coun-
teract frequent market-timing behavior by active traders, yet few (if any)
impose ‘circuit breakers’ prohibiting participants from fleeing to safety in
response to market shocks, or precluding employees from piling into
equities when conditions improve. This research suggests that such restric-
tions would be unlikely to alter behavior of many 401(k) participants, even
during a period of financial upheaval such as that recently experienced by
participants.
In future work, we hope to examine individual trader behavior in more
detail in an effort to further disentangle momentum and contrarian trad-
ing. For example, active traders might include some performance-chasing
active traders and other active traders who dynamically alter their strategy
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over time. People fleeing equity might comprise both inexperienced in-
vestors and more experienced individuals taking a strong contrarian
approach. The deeper question remains as to why so few participants
trade, either for rebalancing or other reasons, and on the prevalence of
inertia among majority of 401(k) participants.
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Endnotes
1. DOL (2010) reports that private profit sharing and thrift plans covered over 62
million active participants as of 2008. ICI (2011) reports that 401(k) and similar
DC plan assets reached $3 trillion as of September 2010. Vanguard (2010)
reports that the average equity allocation of its DC plans was approximately
two-thirds.
2. In our dataset, the number of participants trading per month rose from 2.23
million precrisis to 2.38 million during the turmoil period.
3. See among others, Agnew et al. (2003), Tang et al. (2010), Yamaguchi et al.
(2007), and Young and Utkus (2011).
4. See Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000).
5. Tang et al. (2010) also show that most 401(k) participants do not invest particu-
larly efficiently in noncrisis times, despite having a well-designed investment
menu.
6. The dataset is drawn from Vanguard’s recordkeeper information under
restricted access conditions.
7. The dataset only includes trading consciously conducted by the 401(k) partici-
pants. It does not include the rebalancing by portfolio managers.
8. Using zip codes of individual participants, we impute their nonretirement wealth
and homeownership provided by IXI Corporation.
9. We confirm this definition by checking whether the daily S&P 500 returns are
within one standard deviation of the mean and if monthly S&P 500 volatilities are
within one standard deviation of volatility mean (the monthly volatility is derived
from S&P 500 daily return data from January 2008 through March 2009). Over
this period, the only months with more than half of daily returns and monthly
volatilities outside one standard deviation are September 2008–February 2009.
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10. The trading dataset is not a balanced panel; that is, while many participants are
in the dataset over the entire period, we also include participants who arrived in
or departed from their DC plan over the period. These individuals appear in
the analysis only for months when observed. As noted in Table 6.1, the total
number of participants in the sample grew by 7 percent, which includes both
new entrants and well as those leaving the plan. We do not exclude new
entrants or those leaving the plan in order to avoid a tenure-biased sample.
11. Equity assets include both domestic and international funds and company
stocks, as well as the equity portion of balanced funds such as target date, static
allocation, and traditional balanced funds (where the equity position is
assumed to be 60 percent of the fund’s balance). Fixed-income assets include
bond funds, money-market funds, and contract funds.
12. In this chapter, we concentrate on participant-driven trading in existing bal-
ances, as these represent the bulk of retirement assets; changes in future
contributions are usually tiny compared to balances.
13. Participant characteristics are collected as of September 2008.
14. First-time traders can include long-tenured participants who participated in the
DC plan prior to January 2006 but simply did not trade until the crisis period;
they can also include new participants entering their DC plan after January
2006 or even during the crisis period itself, and then trading in the crisis
months.
15. Note that trading population varies over time and so these monthly statistics
cannot be simply annualized. For instance, first-time traders on average moved
20 percent of their balance to equities during the crisis period and traded 1.1
times per month, but one cannot extrapolate this figure to infer that first-time
traders sold out of equities entirely (a 20 percent per month shift over seven
months) or traded eight times (1.1 over seven months). This is because even
among traders, trading is infrequent, and so the composition of the trading
group varies from month to month.
16. Other research on aggregate investment flows has suggested that trading vol-
ume generally rises with market volatility. See Epps and Epps (1976), Cornell
(1981), and Karpoff (1987).
17. However, evidence on this point is mixed: for instance, Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2001) report that Finnish households display contrarian behavior.
18. A related phenomenon is the ‘ostrich effect’, where investors are more likely to
look at their wealth holdings online in rising markets versus falling markets
(Karlsson et al., 2009).
19. Paper statements are generally sent quarterly.
20. Correlations between current month equity volatility and the spreads between
equity and bond returns for the three time lags are negative in precrisis and the
crisis periods, as well as over the entire period.
21. Participant control variables include indicators for male, age, tenure, home
ownership, account balance, and web access. We also include year dummies.
For a robustness check, we also included tenure in the regressions to check
whether new entrants and leavers behaved differently; results were quantita-
tively similar. The same robustness check for regression (2) in the following
section also produced the same coefficient pattern as without tenure.
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22. Multivariate analysis belowalso controls for theplan’s industry sector (agriculture/
mining/construction; transportation/communication/utilities; manufacturing;
media/entertainment/leisure; trade; finance/insurance/real estate; profes-
sional/nonprofit services; education/health; and government services).
23. Standard errors are also adjusted for heteroskedasticity due to plan clustering
of participant data.
24. Effects for the current month and two-month lagged spread show a similar
contrarian effect; on a net basis, however, there was a small momentum effect
for the lagged spread during the crisis period.
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